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THE DISTINCTIVE QUESTIONS OF
CATHOLICS IN HISTORY
AMELIA J. UELMEN†
I.
Let me start by saying how much I enjoyed working through
the manuscript that Professors Breen and Strang shared with us,
and how much I look forward to the development of this project
on the history of Catholic legal education. My comments focus on
the architecture of Chapter Three and the conceptual driver for
Chapter Five. The frame for my suggestions is the challenge that
emerges clearly in the 1960s when, as James Burtchaell noted,
students were “drop[ping] their faith like baby teeth.”1 As
Professors Breen and Strang summarize: “University administrators
were well aware that even Catholic students were being more
†

Lecturer in Religion & Professional Life and Special Advisor to the Dean at
Georgetown Law; Senior Research Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and
World Affairs. A brief note on some of the ways in which I am personally wrapped
into the history that Professors Breen and Strang recount: My father, Gerald F.
Uelmen, a graduate of Loyola Marymount and Georgetown Law, taught at Loyola
Law School in Los Angeles from 1970–1986, and then he served as the Dean of
Santa Clara Law School from 1986 to 1994, retiring from Santa Clara only recently.
Fr. Richard A. Vachon, S.J. (mentioned in Chapter Three on page 421 of A Light
Unseen’s manuscript), the Jesuit who helped spearhead for Loyola Los Angeles a
reflection on “what a Catholic law school ought to be and how Loyola can become
such,” was a very important presence in our family as my parents matured in their
meld of professional and family life within a Catholic faith perspective. Fr. Vachon is
the priest who celebrated the mass for my First Communion, as well as that of my
older sister and younger brother. I am also Jesuit-educated, with three degrees from
Georgetown (B.A., J.D., and S.J.D.) and an M.A. in Theology from Fordham. I have
been teaching at Georgetown Law since 2011, after serving from 2001 to 2011 as
Fordham Law’s founding director of the Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer’s
Work. For thoughtful comments on and conversations about this manuscript, I
would like to express particular gratitude to: Mark Bosco, S.J.; Kim Daniels; David
Hollenbach, S.J.; Gregory A. Kalschuer, S.J.; Alexia Kelly; Mary Novak; William
Michael Treanor; and Glenn Willard.
1
John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal
Education in the United States 210–459, 415–16 & n.907 (Jan. 20, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the St. John’s Law Review) (quoting Robin
Hoar, What’s So Special About Notre Dame, PACE 23 (Jan. 1968) (alteration in
original)).

105

106

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:105

thoroughly formed by the surrounding culture than by their
faith.”2
Reflecting on this problem in 1971, Georgetown’s President
Robert J. Henle noted that just twenty years prior “a Catholic
university could assume that the students it accepted were ‘solid
in their faith.’ ”3 On this basis, “the task of the university was to
put intellectual substance into their belief, to ground it and found
it rationally, to give them an intellectual control over their
internalized system of values.”4 But by the 1970s this
assumption was no longer valid. He submitted that the task (or
“the point,” as Professors Breen and Strang might say) of
Catholic higher education must respond to this change:
Our task is not to elaborate the faith into a rational system, to
give it substance, to expand it, or increase it. Our problem is a
missionary problem: to reestablish the faith, to reestablish their
belief, to help young people find and internalize a sound system
of values for themselves.5

Philip Gleason elaborates a similar observation in his
magnificent history of Catholic higher education in the twentieth
century. Tracing the dissipation of shared categories and a
shared worldview, he describes several factors that led to the
“[s]plintering of the Scholastic [s]ynthesis,” including varying
interpretations of Thomism, which unsettled the sense that it
could be an integrating force.6
Most to Henle’s point, Gleason reflected: “The stronger
subjective dimension in existentialism, phenomenology, and
Transcendental Thomism no doubt added to the appeal of these
approaches to a generation that found traditional Scholasticism
desiccated and formalistic.”7 As one professor observed in 1960,
even his best undergraduate philosophy students found that a
“ ‘moderately Thomistic’ approach bypassed their most pressing

2

Id. at 414.
Id. at 415 (quoting Robert J. Henle, President, Georgetown Univ., Address at
the Annual President’s Dinner at the Washington, D.C., Alumni Club (1971), quoted
in Memorandum from Donald P. Merrifield, President, Loyola Marymount Univ., to
various recipients (Mar. 5, 1971) (on file with the Loyola Marymount Univ.
Archives)).
4
Id. (quoting Henle, supra note 3).
5
Id. (quoting Henle, supra note 3).
6
PHILIP GLEASON, CONTENDING WITH MODERNITY: CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 297, 299–300 (1995).
7
Id. at 302.
3
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need, which was to determine what aspects of their own personal
experience demanded reflective analysis.”8
What complexities does this raise for how we think about the
history of Catholic legal education? Turning to the manuscript, I
believe it would be helpful to probe more deeply how the various
dimensions of the Chapter Three cohere. In my opinion, the
unifying thread is not yet evident.
Catholic legal education is at the service of people—students,
faculty, and staff—who journey through cultural, social, and
ecclesial history. When we reflect on how students, faculty, and
staff were, on the one hand, experiencing the massive culture,
intellectual, social, and psychic shifts that were manifest in the
1960s, and on the other hand, reading and reflecting on the
documents of the Second Vatican Council, what thematic
connections emerge?
In the current manuscript, parts of the discussion of the
Council documents seem to be thematized at a fairly high level of
abstraction. I think it would strengthen the analysis to place at
the center of Chapter Three the question that Fr. Henle raised:
How has Catholic legal education tried (or fallen short in the
effort) to help students make the connection between their faith
and their daily lives, work, and study, precisely in light of the
existential social and cultural questions raised at the time?9
A tighter connection between these elements might also
complexify the authors’ very broad-brush account of the Council
as a “violent wind” that shook the Church in the United States to
its foundations and especially the supposition that the Council’s
work was itself the cause of “demoralization and collapse” in
Church life.10
I have two suggestions for illustrating the connections.11
One is to take a few overarching themes, such as authority, or

8

Id.
This question, in turn, mirrors the foundational observation in the Council’s
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. See PAUL VI, PASTORAL
CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 43 (1965) (“This split between the faith which
many profess and their daily lives deserves to be counted among the more serious
errors of our age.”).
10
See Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 216.
11
It might also be interesting to explore the impact of shifting reflections on the
criteria for federal funding at Catholic Law Schools. The Gellhorn Report,
coauthored by Walter Gellhorn and a young R. Kent Greenawalt, and the story
behind the exploration of funding for Fordham Law School’s Lincoln Center
construction in the 1960s, is chock full of fascinating tensions.
9
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sexuality, in order to trace how the cultural and ecclesial shifts
on these themes had an impact on the law school curriculum, or
cocurricular culture.12 One catches a glimpse of the potential for
this in the reference to the impact of the arrival of greater
numbers of women and minorities in the 1970s.13 If the
manuscript were to link this data with deeper thematic reflection,
I think it could help to better illuminate the historical journey.
Similarly, in some parts of the manuscript, the upshot of the
discussion of each of the documents of the Council could be
thematized through closer focus on the extent to which the
reflections might impact legal education. For example, in the
discussion of Unitatis redintegratio and Nostra aetate, I would
suggest shifting away from the topic of reception of the
Eucharist,14 toward more focused discussion of the curricular and
cocurricular impact of appreciation for what is “true and holy” in
other religions.15
Reading the discussion of Dignitatis humanae, one wonders
whether this might be a good space to query whether reflection
on this document generated any new insights for law school
curricula on the relationship between Church and State, the
First Amendment, and other aspects of Constitutional Law, as

12

See IN THE LÓGOS OF LOVE: PROMISE & PREDICAMENT IN CATHOLIC
INTELLECTUAL LIFE (James L. Heft & Una M. Cadigan eds., 2016) [hereinafter IN
THE LÓGOS OF LOVE]. In this volume, the chapter by historian Leslie Woodcock
Tentler, Breaking the Silence: Sex, Gender and the Parameters of Catholic
Intellectual Life, might be especially helpful. My own essay in the volume touches on
some of the historical reasons why the Catholic intellectual life has not deeply
permeated professional education and probes the challenge of competing definitions
of the good and the corrosive effect of instrumental reasoning in a law school setting.
See Amelia J. Uelmen, Professional Education and the Paschal Mystery, in IN THE
LÓGOS OF LOVE, supra, at 67–99.
13
Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 399–401.
14
Id. at 362–65.
15
Id. It might be helpful for the authors to acknowledge at some point that the
Catholic intellectual tradition is not limited to engagement with Catholics, Catholic
authors, and Catholic sources. At this point in ecclesial history, ecumenical and
inter-religious dialogue are firmly embedded in the Catholic intellectual tradition
itself. We have not yet seen Chapter Four of the manuscript, but I believe it would
be extremely important to include as a core part of Catholic identity the multidenominational and multi-faith work in which Catholic law schools were engaged in
the 1990s and 2000s and how that engagement remains essential to their Catholic
identity. For example, the gatherings of religiously affiliated law schools over many
years since the 1990s and projects like Fordham’s Institute on Religion, Law and
Lawyer’s Work, as well as many other centers that focus the interdisciplinary
questions at the heart of law and religion—not just Catholicism, and not just Church
life—are also a vital part of Catholic intellectual engagement and identity.
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well as broader discussions about academic freedom, in light of the
social, cultural, and ecclesial changes. The manuscript includes
some references to these shifts, but it might be helpful to explore
further how a more direct connection between these themes and
reflection on the Council might strengthen the work as a whole.
My second suggestion for illustrating the thematic
connections would be to let the data and research be enriched by
the complex questions that emerge from the biographies of
prominent Catholics educators and lawyers who wrestled with
various documents of the Council in light of the social and
cultural shifts in the 1960s and 1970s.
For example, one aspect of Raymond Schroth’s biography of
Father Bob Drinan that I find especially interesting is how it
illustrates the extent to which Drinan’s own efforts to face the
challenges that emerged in the 1960s were limited by his preConciliar spiritual, intellectual, and theological formation. If we
look at Bob Drinan in history, we can see in a very concrete way
just how challenging it was to hold together the moving parts
that are discussed in Chapter Three.16 It might also be
interesting to explore biographical aspects of the life and work of
John T. Noonan, Jr., another prominent figure who wrestled
deeply with the questions emerging from the Council.17
In sum, my first suggestion is to explore with more depth
what was the experience of people—especially law faculty,
students, and administrators—as they engaged the cultural
terrain of the 1960s and beyond, and how that experience
presented new questions and the need for new methods and
approaches to Catholic legal education.
II.
My second question focuses on Chapter Five, which reflects
on how Catholic legal education can maintain its distinctive
contribution to the venture of legal education as a whole. I would
like to suggest that Fr. Henle’s probing questions point to a

16

See generally RAYMOND A. SCHROTH, BOB DRINAN: THE CONTROVERSIAL LIFE
FIRST CATHOLIC PRIEST ELECTED TO CONGRESS (2011). See also Amelia J.
Uelmen, Bob Drinan in History, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 342–43 (2012)
(reviewing SCHROTH, supra).
17
For example, Noonan includes a fascinating autobiographical account of the
religious influences in his youth and childhood in the Prologue to JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1998).
OF THE
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different focus. As noted above: “Our task is not to elaborate the
faith into a rational system, to give it substance, to expand it, or
increase it.”18 Instead, in a post-Conciliar Church, our distinctive
task is “to help young people find and internalize a sound system
of values for themselves.”19
I would elaborate: the most urgent task for Catholic law
schools is to help students reflect on the question of how to make
the connection between the difficult cultural, social, and
institutional questions that they will face as attorneys, in the
light of critical reflection on their own deep values systems.20
My suggestion for Chapter Five is to consider shifting the
focus away from the question of which overarching conceptual
system is the best vehicle for a distinctively Catholic approach to
legal education. I think that question misses the mark of the task
at hand.
I agree that natural law, Catholic social thought, and various
dimensions of the Catholic intellectual tradition—including wide
ranging Catholic spiritualities and engagement with ecumenical
and interreligious dialogue—are all valuable bodies of work for
raising critical questions regarding a deep values structure. All of
these dimensions can and should be incorporated into the
curriculum, legal scholarship, and cocurricular life in various
ways.21 But the core question—the post-Conciliar question—is
how to do this in a way that also corresponds to the existential
reflections, needs, and critiques of current students, faculty, and
staff.22
In addition, for both Chapter Three and Chapter Five my
suggested shift would be to move away from the search for

18
Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 415 (emphasis added) (quoting Henle, supra
note 3).
19
Id.
20
See Amelia J. Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in
Catholic Legal Education: Why Rock the Boat? 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 921, 925–
26 (2004) (contesting the arguments that law school is both too early and too late to
discuss values); Uelmen, supra note 12, at 77 (in response to arguments that
“graduate students are already ‘formed’ in their character,” it is important to note
that they “are certainly not yet formed in their professional identity”).
21
In fact, I have explicitly incorporated aspects of all of these bodies of reflection
and scholarship into my own law school teaching and legal scholarship, and I
currently run a Theology and Culture Reading Group as part of the Georgetown Law
Campus Ministry offerings for law and other graduate students.
22
See generally the profound work of John C. Haughey, S.J., especially JOHN C.
HAUGHEY, WHERE IS KNOWING GOING? THE HORIZONS OF THE KNOWING SUBJECT
(2009).
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articulated motives for setting up clinics, externships, and other
forms of pedagogical engagement and contact with social needs,
to the larger question of how these pedagogical methods and
reflective practices do or do not address the question that Fr.
Henle raised.23 Because this project might be articulated and
communicated in a variety of ways to a variety of audiences, I
think it is something of a sand trap to focus the narrative on the
search for explicitly religious justifications. I also think it is a
mistake to assume that these explanations would give the best xray of religious motives and/or the extent to which an institution
is aligned with an effort to strengthen Catholic identity.
For further reflection on all of these points, I would like to
highlight a resource that might be especially helpful: an
extraordinarily profound and prophetic article written by John
Courtney Murray in 1944, entitled “Towards a Theology for the
Layman.”24
As Gleason pointed out, already in 1939 the young Murray
had offered his reflections on the content of college-level
theology.25 In contrast to seminary theology, which “had for its
formal object ‘the demonstrability of truth from the revealed
Word of God,’ ” what “lay students needed was a theology geared
toward ‘the livability of the Word of God.’ ”26 Murray thus
argued, theology taught in a college context should be “rethought in terms of the particular purpose it was to serve,
namely, relating the truths of faith to the problems lay persons
encountered in the secular world.”27
I believe we need to articulate a similar shift in emphasis in
how we understand the history and current task of Catholic legal
education. The distinctive purpose, the point of Catholic legal

23

In this discussion I hope to respond to the specific questions that Professors
Breen and Strang posed for our reflection: (A) Can Catholic legal education in
principle, be distinctive, and if so, to what extent? (B) To what extent is a particular
body of intellectual commitments necessary for Catholic legal education?
24
John Courtney Murray, Towards a Theology for the Layman (pts. 1 & 2), 5
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 43, 340 (1944). What follows in the text is a riff off of previous
theological scholarship. See Amelia J. Uelmen, A Response to Kenneth Garcia:
“Where They Are, Just as They Are,” 73 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 909 (2012); see also
Kenneth N. Garcia, “Reversing the Secularist Drift”: John Courtney Murray and the
Telos of Catholic Higher Education, 73 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 890 (2012); Gregory A.
Kalscheur, A Response to Kenneth Garcia: Healthy Secularity and the Task of a
Catholic University, 73 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 924 (2012).
25
GLEASON, supra note 6, at 165.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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education, should be framed in terms of the problems that future
lawyers will encounter in the world. Again, this does not discard
the robust resources of the Tradition, but it does place much
greater emphasis on the methods for helping students to engage
these questions. For example, I believe we need to move far
beyond podium-style explanations of intellectual categories and
content in order to facilitate reflection on the actual connections
that students make with their own values—and with problems in
the world.
Murray’s 1944 two-part analysis, “Towards a Theology for
the Layman,”28 is an amazing model for shifting the focus away
from the abstract question of distinction (in and of itself), and the
apologetic explanation of those distinctions, to the question of
how the theological education of lay people should be shaped by
their distinct roles and tasks in the world.29 In contrast to those
who suggested that lay theology should be “only quantitatively or
rhetorically different from that taught in seminaries—a sort of
Summa Theologica with the hard parts left out”30—Murray
explained that the lay person needed “a theology that, remaining
theology, keeps to an order of its own, and has all the perfection
proper to that order.”31
The article then proceeds to outline the sensitivities, methods,
content, and tone of an approach to lay theology. Working by
analogy, I believe Murray points the way toward an elaboration
of the kinds of methods, content, and tone that could be
applicable to a professional school setting—and Catholic legal
education in particular.32
Below I summarize briefly what I have discussed in other
scholarship,33 while at the same time urging direct engagement
with Murray’s prophetic and illuminating text.

28

Murray, supra note 24.
John Courtney Murray, Reversing the Secularist Drift, 24 THOUGHT 36, 41–42
(1949) (noting that the “fulcrum” of a positive effort to reverse the intellectual tide
not in undergraduate sections of the university, but among the potentially more
influential research scholars in the graduate and professional schools).
30
Murray, supra note 24, at 74.
31
Id.
32
Here it would be very important also to note that since the publication of
Murray’s 1944 reflection, the seminary formation of clergy has of course also
undergone massive shifts, especially in light of the Second Vatican Council’s broad
openness to engaging the concerns and questions of the modern world. This very rich
and important topic is far beyond the scope of this brief comment.
33
See Uelmen, supra note 24.
29
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1. The ground for lay theology is the perspective and experience
of lay people themselves, to the point of saying that when it
comes to the problem of devising the formula for
penetrating the social order, “only the laity, by reason of
their peculiar situation, are in a position to solve it.”34 Lay
theology courses “must reach their subject as grace reaches
him, where he is, just as he is. They must insert themselves
into the psychological context which is given, in order
effectively to do their work of illumination and
inspiration.”35
2. Lay theology should also give prominence to an “affective
and dynamic concept of faith, not only as knowledge of
God but as a ‘movement’ towards a heavenly Father.”36 “Its
perspectives and movement should be ‘manwards,’ ” focused
on an understanding of God’s action in the world.37 The
attention of lay theology should be directed to what the life
of God is for us (quoad nos), not the life of God in God’s self
(quoad se), “to psychological effectiveness of presentation
rather than to abstract logic, . . . to the whole truth in its
relation to personal and social life rather than to single
truths in their relation to rational philosophy . . . .”38
3. This focus also called for a shift in tone, away from polemical
apologetics. As Murray describes it, the seminary “course
practically moves from adversary to adversary, and at every
turn comes to grips with error.”39 The downside of this
approach is that
it tends to create a defensive mentality; one is always
answering, and one frequently has the defeated feeling
that one is not reaching the source of the difficulty,
which is often not in reason and cannot be reached by
reason. There is always a gap between apologetic
argument and faith; it leads up to faith, not into it, and
still less does it engender an experience of faith as the
power of God unto salvation.40
In a lay course, Murray recommended that apologetics be
given “a very subordinate place.”41

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Murray, supra note 24, at 70.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 361, 362–63.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 351.
Id.
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4. Because the laity need to be prepared to face “secularism and
[religious] indifferentism,” which are “not just religious
errors, but religious diseases, which have to be healed at a
level in the soul deeper than that of reason,”42 “the careful
application of little apologetic ‘band-aids’ here and there will
not suffice.”43 Thus, Murray suggests, the tone and “mood
of teaching” should be “pacific and positive.”44
5. All these factors come together in an overarching vision not
so much of the abstract unity of knowledge, but of the unity
of the human family. Murray quotes extensively from the
conclusion of Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno
(1931), which identifies “the mutual bond” of unity in the
human family as the basis of peace and the common good.45
He concludes: “[A] lay course in theology will have been
essentially a failure if it does not succeed in communicating
to the student this ‘vue obsédante de l’unité humaine’ which,
as Lubac has well said, is at the basis of the Gospel.”46
Because this vision is the “indispensable foundation of the
Christian social mentality, the ultimate motivation of the
whole Christian social program,” it is the primary
expression of the experience of God, quoad nos, which can
assure both academic unity and religious power.47

I realize that it would take quite a bit of work to flesh out
how Murray’s proposals for “lay theology” might inform various
dimensions of the work of Catholic legal education. It would also
require a further layer of research to explore which aspects of the
analysis are no longer applicable in a post-Conciliar Church.
Nonetheless, I believe that Murray’s frame contains powerful and
even prophetic seeds for theorizing how to develop the content,
the methods, and especially the tone with which to engage the
Catholic intellectual tradition, Catholic social thought, and even
the arguments of natural law, in a contemporary law school
setting.

42

Id.
Id. at 352.
44
Id. at 355.
45
Id. at 365–66 (quoting PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO
¶ 137 (1931)).
46
Id. at 366 (quoting Henri de Lubac, Cathoicisme: Les aspects sociaux du
dogme catholique, at iv (Paris, Les Eds. du Cerf 1938)).
47
Id.
43
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Further, attention to reaching the students “where they are,
just as they are,”48 helping them integrate their personal and
religious values into their professional identity, leaving room also
for the “affective and dynamic” dimensions of their efforts to find
meaning in their own lives and work also underscores the path
that many Catholic law schools have already pursued: courses
that incorporate a substantial component of reflection and
reflective practices (whether in seminars, externships, etc.) and a
variety of clinical settings.
Murray’s “architecture” does not negate the need for
intellectual categories, but neither does it neglect the dimensions
of human experience that can foster, as Fr. Henle put it,
reflection on the process that will help young professionals to
“find and internalize a sound system of values for themselves.”49
This is not to say that the mission is already accomplished in
the ongoing work of clinics and other reflective practices in
Catholic law schools today. It is only to submit that we need a
more fertile terrain for reflection than that provided by a focus on
the extent to which Catholic law schools are “distinctive” from
their secular counterparts. In sum, for the work of Chapter Five,
my suggestion is to read and meditate on John Courtney
Murray’s “A Theology for the Layman.” In fact, I think Murray’s
reflections are so profound that they would be worthy of a
symposium like this one, perhaps with applications to various
curricula in Catholic higher education.
III.
I close with gratitude to Professors Breen and Strang for
seeking our input on their important work, to my colleagues in
legal education for a very stimulating discussion, and especially
to the students of and faculty advisors to the Journal of Catholic
Legal Studies for making widely available our reflections on how
to bring forward, together, our shared commitments to Catholic
legal education.

48
49

See id. at 348; text accompanying supra note 35.
Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 415 (quoting Henle, supra note 3).

